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The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? against this subgroup of American scientists, and the representations repeatedly made of them in congressional committees and broad-market media outlets, I will attempt to illuminate broader changes in assumptions both about scientists and about the nature of science after World War II.
More than a dozen theoretical physicists suffered publicly-and often over long durations-in the vise-grip of postwar anticommunism: Edward Condon, Joseph Weinberg, Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, David Bohm, Max Friedman, I. David Fox, Byron Darling, Bruce Dayton, Philip Morrison, Bernard Peters, Wendell Furry, Albert Einstein, and J. Robert Oppenheimer. Their cases often remained in the news for months at a time, resurfacing as a result of surreptitious leaks by their political enemies.
2 Thousands of scientists and engineers were affected by McCarthyism; only a few became headlines in the newspapers or suffered repeated hounding by congressional committees. More theoretical physicists were called by HUAC, for example, as (''unfriendly'') witnesses between 1948 and 1953 than members of any other academic specialty: more than twice the number of chemists or historians; almost three times the number of biologists; nearly four times the number of economists or philosophers, and so on. The committee devoted no fewer than twenty-seven hearings to investigations of theorists and their ''Communist infiltration'' of weapons projects and educational institutions during this period-an average of nearly five per year, twice as many as those involving any other academic field. 3 Nor was HUAC alone. When Life magazine ran a two-page spread in April 1949 on a ''red rumpus'' of ''dupes and fellow travelers'' who purportedly gave aid to Communist-front organizations-featuring photographs of fifty individualstwice as many theoretical physicists as members of any other academic field were included. 4 The only other scientists to receive comparable sustained scrutiny from the likes of HUAC and the national media included astronomer Harlow Shapley and physical chemist Linus Pauling-both politically outspoken senior scientistsand experimental physicist Frank Oppenheimer, Robert's younger brother. Chemists and engineers were certainly implicated at times during the early Cold War. Yet theorists became cultural stand-ins for postwar intellectuals, their portrayals fitting a common pattern with remarkable consistency.
These dozen or so theoretical physicists surely came under fire for many reasons; with hindsight their troubles appear almost overdetermined. Most were Jewish; several had been active in labor organizing before or during the war; a few had flirted with the Communist Party in their youth; many were active in other leftwing political organizations after the war. Perhaps most important, however, they had close and long-standing ties with Robert Oppenheimer, all but Darling and Einstein having been trained by him as graduate students or postdoctoral fellows. (When he became director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 1947, Oppenheimer even became Einstein's ''boss,'' although Einstein had been under intense FBI surveillance long before then.) As previously classified documents make clear, Oppenheimer had enemies within the military and intelligence R            branches of the government from his earliest days in the wartime Manhattan Project; he was under surveillance even before most of his students and colleagues were. Debate continues to this day over the extent of Oppenheimer's sympathies-and possible affiliation-with the Communist Party. 5 It is certainly plausible that this circle of theorists garnered undue attention as ''collateral damage,'' caught in the escalating cross fire between Oppenheimer's growing list of enemies and the central figure himself, whose personnel security hearing in spring 1954 marked the climax of McCarthyist attacks on scientists and public intellectuals. Yet even if connections to Oppenheimer explain why these particular people were singled out, the pedagogical links alone do not explain the types of representations formed about theory and theorists as a whole. Petty politics might have fixed the victims, but not the charge.
The portrait of theoretical physicists that eventually solidified into a recognizable (and oft-repeated) ideal type relied on three separate elements. None was beyond question; some were openly challenged in their day. Changing political exigencies, however, eventually snuffed out the dissenting voices, and by 1948-49 the formula had been set. The first piece of the Cold War equation was that theorists had single-handedly built the atomic bomb. The wartime Los Alamos laboratory had been headed by the theorist Oppenheimer, and soon after the war lack of information due to government secrecy led to a skewed picture of how the bombs had been built. Second, a widespread presumption emerged that ''atomic secrets'' existed whose possession would allow other countries immediately to build their own bombs. By the late 1940s, if not immediately in the wake of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many came to believe that these ''secrets'' consisted of purely theoretical information, perhaps even single equations that only theorists understood and that could be smuggled out of the country on tiny scraps of paper. As soon as journalists and politicians concurred that text-based atomic secrets existed and that theorists were their special keepers, it seemed to follow that theorists required special scrutiny. The anticommunist backlash struck theorists particularly hard, coalescing in the third and final element of the Cold War formula: reporters, senators, and federal judges alike began to assert that theoretical physicists were inherently a breed apart, more susceptible to Communist influence than any other group of people. By the late 1940s, theorists routinely were cast as doubly dangerous proto-spies: of all scientists, theorists held the most important information, and they were most likely to give it away.
Lurking behind this formulaic depiction of the postwar theorist lay a specific idea of how science works, not just how various scientists behave. By tracing discussions of purported ''atomic secrets'' and their ''red'' keepers-as these unfolded in such varied venues as the New York Times, Newsweek, Time, Life, Fortune, the Saturday Evening Post, Reader's Digest, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, as well as in congressional hearings, government reports, and oratory reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day-we learn about the shifting cultural and political valence of ''tacit knowl-The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? edge'' within postwar America. 6 Historians and sociologists of science have long been interested in tacit knowledge: craftlike skill and artisanal ''know-how'' crucial to the practice of science, yet incapable of being transmitted by texts alone. Earlier figures such as Thomas Edison had been publicly valorized precisely on the strength of their storehouses of tacit knowledge rather than formal book-learning. Recent innovative studies by sociologists and anthropologists, meanwhile, have emphasized how critical tacit knowledge has been and remains for designing and building nuclear weapons. 7 As I argue here, such evaluations of tacit knowledge have a history-a history closely intertwined with changing ideas about theory and theorists in Cold War America. Naturally, certain kinds of textual information could aid other groups in their efforts to build atomic bombs, mainly by helping them avoid ''blind alleys'' and focus their replication efforts on techniques that had been shown to work. What I find fascinating is the way in which congressional, judicial, and journalistic discussions collapsed all these issues, beginning in the late 1940s, to focus narrowly around ''secret formulas'' that somehow held the key to the entire bomb. During the early Cold War years, the importance of tacit knowledge fell out of discussions, leaving only text-based information as the seeming ''secret'' of the bomb-with deleterious effects for many theoretical physicists.
The Work of Many People
Nuclear weapons have always been ''the work of many people.'' Edward Teller introduced the phrase in 1955 when recalling the range of efforts and contributions-from specialists in many different fields-to the American hydrogenbomb effort. 8 (Many of Teller's critics found the maneuver a disingenuous effort to deflect criticism after his withering performance at Oppenheimer's personnel security hearing mere months before, and his less-than-generous sharing of credit throughout the early 1950s.) 9 Whether made in good faith or not, Teller's remark was accurate and applies equally to the wartime efforts to build atomic bombs. At its peak, the wartime Manhattan Project employed more than 125,000 people at more than thirty sites, ultimately spending more than $2 billion. Huge factory towns sprung up at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington; university facilities were converted to top-secret laboratories at Berkeley, Columbia, the University of Chicago, and elsewhere; and a new laboratory was created at Los Alamos, New Mexico.
In all these facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians of many stripes contributed their expertise to turn nuclear weapons into a reality. The overall scientific directors of the wartime project were Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, an electrical engineer and a chemist, respectively. The theorist Oppenheimer served as scientific director of the Los Alamos laboratory, where he was joined by a nine-R            person governing board that included one fellow theorist alongside four experimental physicists, two chemists, and two experts in ordnance. Several divisions were created at Los Alamos, focusing on metallurgy, chemistry, ballistics, ordnance, electrical engineering, experimental physics, and theoretical physics. The laboratory's wartime organization chart shows the groups arranged in a circle and connected by spindly links; no group appeared on top directing the others. 10 A few months after the war, the War Department awarded eleven ''Medals for Merit'' to scientific staff of the Manhattan Project for their contributions to the atomic bomb project; a little more than one-quarter went to theoretical physicists, while half went to chemists and engineers.
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Of all the work done at wartime Los Alamos, the challenge of implosiondetonating a sphere of conventional explosives to compress fissionable material into a superdense critical mass-best exemplified the melding of many groups' efforts and the central place of tacit knowledge in making bombs. 12 From the metallurgy of plutonium, to the design and fabrication of sufficiently homogenous shaped-charge lenses, to the chemistry of radioactive ''initiators,'' to the physical measurements of spontaneous fission rates and reaction cross sections, to the challenges of wiring the detonation circuits to fire simultaneously, to the mathematical studies of in-going shock waves and the hydrodynamics of matter under extreme conditions, the implosion device was a product of varied-and harried-contributions. The Theoretical Physics division or ''T-division'' remained the smallest of all divisions at Los Alamos, soon dwarfed by such groups as the Engineering Ordnance division. 13 The T-division played some important roles throughout the project, estimating critical masses, trying to calculate optimal shapes for the conventional-explosive lenses, and so on; in some instances, their contributions proved critical, while in others the T-division struggled to play catch-up to the other groups.
14 Throughout the war, theorists remained hamstrung, having no self-consistent theory of nuclear forces and no reliable way to calculate properties of nuclear matter in bulk, even under idealized conditions-problems that would haunt theoretical physicists for the next decade and a half. 15 Members of Los Alamos's T-division developed some ''good enough'' approximation methods, learning clever ways to ''get the numbers out,'' in Sam Schweber's telling phrase. But even these approximations rarely drove design or manufacturing efforts; most calculations relied upon tedious hand-cranked or punched-card mechanical calculators, and the nonlinear nature of the equations made extrapolation from one curve to another treacherous. At no time could the T-division calculate the properties of the bomb from first principles; atomic bombs have never resulted from the mere ''application'' of explicit formulas, let alone fullblown theories. 16 News of the surprise bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was the first most people in the United States and abroad had heard of atomic bombs. The only information released about technical aspects of the bombs came from a specially prepared government report, released to the press on the evening of The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? was widely known to working scientists, or that had ''no real bearing on the production of atomic bombs'' was fit for release. Little of the messy combination of chemistry, metallurgy, engineering, and industrial-scale manufacturing met these criteria; these aspects of the sprawling project, crucial to the actual design and production of atomic bombs, remained closely guarded. Instead, Smyth focused narrowly on ideas from physics, pushing theoretical physics in particular to the forefront-only such material was deemed safe enough to publicize. Ironically, most people read in Smyth's Report the lesson that theorists had built the bomb (and by implication, had won the war). 17 A supplemental document released a few months later by the Senate's new Special Committee on Atomic Energy, entitled Essential Information on Atomic Energy, reinforced the lesson, depicting atomic bombs as the natural outcome of continuous developments in atomic theory. A ''chronological table'' at the end of the report extended the narrative as far back as 400 BC to the ancient Greek atomists! 18 Official reports on the Manhattan Project painted a consistent-if consistently inaccurate-picture: theoretical physicists had built the bomb. True or false, the first part of the Cold War formula was in place.
The Making of a ''Secret''
The notion that there existed a single ''secret'' to the atomic bomb was not hatched all at once with the bombings in August 1945 or the release of the Smyth Report. It emerged over time, unfolding in lockstep with changing political tidings. In the weeks after news of the bombs broke, rumors of legislative efforts (in the form of the May-Johnson bill) that would have extended the wartime military regime into peacetime spurred groups of scientists and engineers at Los Alamos, the University of Chicago, Oak Ridge, and elsewhere to speak out about the nature of atomic weapons. The new bill would have kept all aspects of atomic energy under strict military control, perpetuating the wartime secrecy protocols. In response, the fledgling ''atomic scientists' movement'' launched a vigorous public-relations campaign, putting mimeograph machines into motion to counter the proposal. 19 Their pamphlets made it into the hands of editors at the New Republic, who quoted from R            them approvingly in the 8 October 1945 issue, adding italics for their own emphasis: '' 'There is no secret to be kept.' '' The ''principles'' required for the explosive release of atomic energy, the editors continued (still quoting from the scientists' memoranda), '' 'have been the common property of scientists throughout the world for the last five years.' '' President Truman sounded a similar note that same week when he delivered his first speech to Congress on atomic policy matters. Like the atomic scientists, Truman insisted that ''the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery [of the atomic bomb] is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time. '' 20 That autumn, scientists and journalists developed a second, related response: the only secret about the bomb was whether or not it would work-not how to design or produce one-and that ''secret'' had disappeared with the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 21 No secrets, no need for military control.
Beyond these immediate denials that there were any secrets, speculation continued as to whether ''atomic secrets'' existed and what they might be. Scientists, journalists, and politicians proposed at least eight distinct candidates, each put forward as the ''atomic secret'' between 1945 and 1955. The candidates hardly emerged at random; two distinct phases marked the ''secrets'' discussions. 22 Between 1945 and 1948, most coverage focused on raw materials and industrial infrastructure as the keys to producing atomic weapons, emphasizing nontextual ''knowhow'' rather than textual ''knowledge'' or ''information.'' Beginning late in 1948 and accelerating through the mid-1950s, the weight of discussion among politicians and journalists shifted, focusing instead on textual and theoretical ''information'' as the essential ''secret'' of the atomic bomb, rather than experimental skill or industrial capacity. Many now claimed that specific, esoteric formulas-the x's and y's of theoretical physics-contained the true secrets of the atomic bomb. 24 One month earlier, a vice president at the University of Chicago emphasized industrial contributions, ''working on a gigantic scale,'' as the essential ingredients in the bomb's development. Time magazine reassured its readers in mid-September 1945 that there were ''no immediate dangers'' that other nations could threaten the United States with their own atomic bombs, ''because at this stage of the bomb's development huge production plants (which exist in the U.S. alone) are necessary.'' Throughout the remainder The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? of 1945 and much of 1946, conservative members of Congress-alarmed to learn the extent of foreign-born scientists' contributions to the Manhattan Project-repeatedly heralded ''American industrial and technological superiority'' as the real secret to the project's success. One representative went so far as to declare, ''I am not giving the principal credit for the production of the bomb to the scientists,'' who (he continued) would have been unable to do anything useful had it not been for ''the trained fingers of the technician. . . . -in other words, American knowhow produced the atomic bomb.'' 25 As late as October 1948, a reporter for the New York Times emphasized that ''engineering and technical know-how''-embodied in teams working in ''gigantic facilities''-was ''of equal or greater importance'' than any ''theoretical scientific knowledge'' that was by then widely shared. The only ''secrets'' to be kept, urged veterans of the wartime weapons projects when testifying before Congress, were technical details and manufacturing processes. 26 Throughout this first phase of discussions-much of it elicited by overt political debate regarding the proper role and scope of the new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-the emphasis remained on controlling matériel and industrial capacity. Driving the message home, several scientists, politicians, and journalists during this period spoke of a basic category error: bombs are not formulas. One week before the three-nation accord on atomic energy, signed on 15 November 1945 by President Truman and Prime Ministers Clement Attlee of the United Kingdom and MacKenzie King of Canada, former Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered to the British Parliament a lesson on the sociology of knowledge. What the Americans sought not to disclose after the war, Churchill explained, is the practical production methods, which they have developed at enormous expense and on a gigantic scale. This would not be an affair of scientists or diplomats sending over formulas. To be effective, any such disclosure would have to take the form of a considerable number of Soviet specialists, engineers and scientists visiting the United States arsenals, for that is what the manufacturing centers of the atomic bomb really are.
They would have to visit them and would have to dwell there so they could have it all explained to them and the officials would then return to their own country with all the information they had obtained and with any further improvements which might have occurred to them. 27 No mere written exchanges here. Churchill evoked a notion of tacit knowledge to explain how working knowledge of atomic bombs could be transported from one country to another. His successor, Attlee, continued the lesson later that month, explaining that the ability to construct atomic bombs ''cannot be given in a formula or a handbook or a blueprint. It can only be done by scientists and technicians being taken to the plant, everything being shown and explained to them in great detail. '' 28 Back in the states, scientists tried to deliver a similar message to Congress and the public, testifying that atomic bombs ''are not matters that can be stolen and transmitted in the form of information.'' 29 Smyth told reporters from Life magazine that ''There is no 'secret' of the atomic bomb in the sense of a mysterious formula R            that can be written on a slip of paper and carried in the sole of a shoe or the handle of a hunting knife.'' The message got through to some mainstream journalists. Responding to allegations in July 1947 that some servicemen at wartime Los Alamos had stolen classified information about the bomb project (by pilfering a few documents to keep as souvenirs), the New York Times replied that ''we do not believe that the atomic 'secret' is something that can be written down in a page or two, like a recipe for corn bread. We suspect that some tons of blueprints might convey it, and that it will never be carried overseas in the heel of a shoe.'' 30 It would take much more than such pencil-and-paper information to design and manufacture nuclear weapons; the ''secrets'' were not textual in nature but based on artisanal know-how and industrial production. Such was the dominant message during 1945-48.
The ''bombs are not formulas'' campaign was not without its detractors during this early period. Competing visions of atomic secrets emerged in the course of (often quite bitter) political debate over domestic and international proposals for the control of atomic energy. Allegations of atomic espionage-along with the assumption that various ''secrets'' existed that could be stolen, with great benefit to foreign nations-were used as political instruments as early as 1946. As Gregg Herken has shown, for example, news of a Canadian spy ring that had operated during the war was leaked by General Groves to certain hand-picked journalists who were friendly to the general's goal of erecting military rather than civilian control over the postwar atom. 31 Nor did Groves only enlist journalists while pursuing this tactic. In March 1946, in the midst of debate over competing domestic atomic energy bills, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper read into the Congressional Record a letter from Groves claiming that British physicist Alan Nunn May (who had worked in Canada during the war and later confessed to sharing material with the Soviets) ''has a general knowledge of the construction of the atomic bomb.'' Groves's letter continued, suggesting that May ''understands the principles of design and construction'' of nuclear reactors (which could be used to produce fissionable materials such as plutonium). The New York Times reported that Hickenlooper's sudden introduction of Groves's letter caught rival Senator Brien McMahon, backing a bill for civilian control of atomic energy, by surprise, coming as it did at a crucial juncture of the debate. Groves's and Hickenlooper's allegations were seen as adding great weight -at just the right moment-to Senator Arthur Vandenberg's proposed amendment to McMahon's bill, calling for a military advisory board to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission. 32 Claims about ''general knowledge of the construction of the atomic bomb''-knowledge of ''principles'' that could be written down and given to Soviet agents-helped tip the balance, ensuring passage of Vandenberg's promilitary amendment. Never mind that the official report on the alleged Canadian spy ring concluded three months later that ''no one in Canada could have revealed how to make an atomic bomb. There was no one in Canada who had that information''-as Groves, overseer of the entire wartime project, had well
The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? known all along. 33 Innuendo about secrets in the form of ''general knowledge'' and ''principles'' that could be stolen had come in handy.
If such political jockeying around matters atomic began in the Senate's Special Committee on Atomic Energy, it soon became the basic operating procedure for the HUAC. As Jessica Wang has demonstrated, HUAC's forays followed a predictable political timetable. After orchestrating a series of press leaks throughout spring 1947, HUAC delivered its first explicit salvo on the ''atomic secrets'' front on 1 March 1948 when it announced that theoretical physicist Edward Condon, then director of the National Bureau of Standards, constituted ''one of the weakest links in our atomic security''-an official report delivered just days before debate over appropriations for HUAC was set to begin in Congress. 34 The first attack by HUAC on theorists involved few details of the nature of their work; Condon qua theorist was not really under discussion. The theorist's outspoken support for the McMahon bill throughout 1946, combined with the fact that he had been hired to direct the bureau by then Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace-and hence offered the Republican-dominated HUAC an opportunity to strike at Truman and his most left-leaning cabinet member-were probably sufficient to single Condon out as a target. 35 The list of HUAC's ''weak links'' was quickly expanded and the committee conducted highly publicized hearings later that year into supposed Communist activities and atomic espionage during the wartime Manhattan Project. This time the nature of theoretical physics and the trustworthiness of theorists played a larger role. Releasing their new report in September 1948, in time for maximum electionyear impact (the New York Times reported Truman's ''no comment'' on the report while campaigning in Texas), HUAC claimed that several Manhattan Project scientists had passed along ''vital information'' on the bomb to the Soviets. 36 Following charges against the chemists Clarence Hiskey, John Chapin, and Martin Kamen, HUAC included a titillating accusation against a person identified only as ''Scientist X,'' who had worked at the University of California's Radiation Laboratory during the war, one of the contracting laboratories of the Manhattan Project. This person, HUAC charged, had visited the house of Steve Nelson, a Bay Area Communist Party member, at 1:30 a.m. one morning in March 1943. Once there, Scientist X allegedly read to Nelson a complicated formula, which Nelson copied down. Scientist X gave as his reason for asking Nelson to copy it down that the formula was in the handwriting of some other person, and that he, Scientist X, had to return the formula to the University of California radiation laboratories in the morning. 37 HUAC's charge displayed a remarkable fetish for the written word-a medieval worship of the manuscript page and the authorial power of an individual's penmanship. Atomic bombs were not children of the Industrial Revolution after all, cried R            HUAC; bombs' ''vital'' innards were the stuff of manuscript culture, captured in symbols on a page.
The committee's sensational charges take on a still more bizarre cast when compared to the declassified transcript of the conversation, as captured by officers of the Military Intelligence Division. The speaker identified as ''Steve'' had actually asked his interlocutor for copies of an article that had ''already been published.'' ''I could certainly get reprints of it,'' the other person replied, although he added quickly that ''the leaflet itself will give them [the Soviets] no knowledge'' with which they could actually build anything. The conversation turned to whether or not the Soviet Union had ''the means and raw materials'' to construct atomic bombs, over and above any explicit information that might be conveyed to them. Near the end of the transcript, the officers noted that Steve's conversation partner ''dictated and STEVE wrote down at this point approximately 150 to 200 words, largely indistinguishable, but believed to be from the conversation a basic formula of some type''; ''the word 'spectograph' [sic] was mentioned.'' What was not mentioned anywhere in the transcript-nearly every page of which includes several interruptions because the speakers' words were ''unintelligible,'' and thus ''a few words were missed''-was anything about other peoples' handwriting or top-secret manuscripts that had to be returned to the laboratory. What HUAC later construed as ''a complicated formula'' was, in the first instance, only assumed to be ''a basic formula'' based on a conversation that had been largely ''unintelligible.'' All the while, Steve's interlocutor consistently expressed doubts that textual materials (let alone formulas) would be of any use at all. 38 Of course, nothing beyond HUAC's version was available to the public at the time, and HUAC's florid (and largely manufactured) account received immediate, feverish attention. Time magazine covered HUAC's report under the boldface subheading, ''Hot Formula.'' 39 ''Atomic secrets'' were back, cast now as explicit, textual information rather than tacit ''know-how'' or industrial capacity. HUAC milked the story relentlessly over the next year, sending out nearly identical press releases (dressed as ''fresh news'') and garnering at least eight front-page headlines in the New York Times for what remained essentially the same story. The ''trial by newspaper'' began to work: many soon proclaimed that bombs might be formulas after all. 40 The secrets-as-formula formula thus emerged a full year before Truman announced the Soviets' detonation of their own atomic bomb, and seventeen months before the theorist Klaus Fuchs confessed to spying for the Soviets during the war. These later events solidified the ''hot formula'' message, but did not create it. One week after Truman's announcement about the Soviet ''Joe I'' bomb, HUAC identified the mysterious ''Scientist X'' as theoretical physicist Joseph Weinberg. Their voluminous, three-volume follow-up report on ''Communist Infiltration of the Radiation Laboratory'' implicated Weinberg along with four other young theorists, all of whom had worked at the Manhattan Project site during the war, and all of whom were now accused of having been Communists. Politicians and the public The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? grasped at this ''explanation'' for the Soviet bomb: theorists had stolen secret formulas during the war and shepherded them to the Soviets; only because of theorists' treachery did Stalin now possess nuclear weapons. 41 The association between theorists and atomic secrets grew stronger still following the revelation, in early February 1950, that theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs, who had worked at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos during the war as a member of the British team, had confessed to spying for the Soviet Union. Fuchs's announcement set off a domino effect of accusations and confessions during spring and summer 1950, ultimately implicating Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and Morton Sobell as members of an American ''spy ring'' working during the war to ferret ''atomic secrets''-in the form of reports, formulas, blueprints, and graphs-to the Soviets. 42 The swirl of comment by politicians and journalists surrounding each of these events cemented the shift in assumptions about what constituted ''atomic secrets'' and what types of people were most likely to hold and transmit such secrets. The secrets now became solidly theoretical, and the secret-keepers seemed more than ever to be theoretical physicists.
During 1948-55, the formula linking textual secrets with theorist-keepers calcified into a robust cultural artifact. Five distinct but related candidates for ''the atomic secret'' were proposed during this later phase, all centered around textual information rather than tacit knowledge: (1) ''complicated formulas,'' akin to HUAC's charge against ''Scientist X''; (2) information about the nation's nuclear stockpile-the types and numbers of nuclear weapons being made; (3) the size and shape of the bomb; (4) the implosion mechanism; and (5) more general ''principles'' and ''theories'' of bomb design. All of these types of information could be written down on paper and smuggled out of the country; each ''secret'' candidate gained force from unfolding political events.
The charge by HUAC about ''complicated formulas'' soon received many echoes; two days after Truman's announcement about the Soviet atomic bomb, science journalist Waldemar Kaempffert declared, ''No doubt Soviet agents in this country pieced together scraps of information'' from American physicists, from which the bomb had been built. A year and a half later, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy alleged that David Greenglass-an Army machinist at Los Alamos during World War II and the government's chief witness against his sister and brother-inlaw, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg-had ''met with a Russian official in New York and was asked to supply a mathematical formula concerning high-explosive lenses used in the Nagasaki-type weapon.'' Greenglass was not the only person charged with peddling secret formulas; J. Edgar Hoover, imperious director of the FBI, explained in Reader's Digest in May 1951 how the ''crime of the century'' had unfolded: the chemist-turned-courier Harry Gold ''received formulas and various other technical data about atomic research'' from Klaus Fuchs, and then passed them on to Russian agents. Indeed, Hoover charged, between Gold and Fuchs, ''the basic secrets of nuclear fission had been stolen''-as if there remained any ''basic secrets of nuclear fission'' to be stolen from wartime Los Alamos! (It was precisely the lack of such ''secrets'' that had allowed Smyth to focus so squarely on basic nuclear physics in his report.) In October 1952 a new film entitled The Thief depicted a nuclear physicist-turned-traitor who surreptitiously photographed his colleagues' ''top secret scientific papers'' to pass them along to foreign agents. 43 Even the medium of film began to profess the power of texts.
Beyond ''hot formulas,'' other kinds of textual information came under scrutiny. On the day that President Truman delivered his controversial decision for ''crash course'' development of a hydrogen bomb, Senator Brien McMahon delivered a speech in Detroit urging that the most important atomic secrets concerned the nation's nuclear stockpile. How could democracy function, McMahon asked, if neither the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (of which he was chair) nor the public at large had access to basic information about ''how many bombs and atomic weapons we possess and how fast we are producing them''? Several years later, the editors of U.S. News & World Report concurred with McMahon that the real ''secrets'' had to do with stockpiles and strike capabilities-even if they disagreed with McMahon on whether or not such ''secrets'' should be released. 44 Others claimed that the real secrets concerned the outward appearance and basic dimensions of atomic bombs, likewise textual information that could easily fall into the wrong hands. Soon after being elevated to chair of the Atomic Energy Commission, for example, Gordon Dean told the editors of U.S. News & World Report that the real secrets of the bomb concerned ''the size, the weight, the shape and general characteristics of the gadget,'' while journalist Alan Moorehead explained part of Klaus Fuchs's treachery: ''He gave the size of the bomb-a vital point. . . . He gave his own calculations of the actual dimensions of the parts.'' Two of McMahon's fellow senators on the joint committee argued more generally that ''one of the strong points about the atomic weapon is the fact that it creates mystery.'' 45 To Senators Tydings and Connally, ''mystery''-engendered by textual ''secrets'' regarding stockpile and bomb-size-was deemed politically vital to the entire atomic weapons program, all replication and proliferation issues aside.
During and after the Rosenbergs' trial in spring 1951, most discussion of ''atomic secrets'' turned on information supposedly gleaned by the machinist Greenglass concerning the implosion mechanism for detonating plutonium bombs. At the start of the trial, Life magazine described the nature of Greenglass's thievery: he had stolen ''this nation's most closely guarded and worst kept secret: the mechanism of the atomic bomb.'' ''Having wangled information out of loquacious scientists,'' Life's coverage continued, Greenglass ''was able to show Julius [Rosenberg] a rough design of the ultrasecret detonating lens producing the implosion that triggers the bomb into action.'' Fuchs, too, was accused of giving away ''a description of an implosion lens'' as part of the sheaf of papers he passed off to Harry Gold. Ironically, the Atomic Energy Commission had allowed David Greenglass to testify
The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? about the implosion lenses (even showing diagrams) during the Rosenbergs' trialto a partially open court whose gallery had been cleared of all listeners except journalists!-precisely because it had deemed this information safe enough for release. Gordon Dean, AEC chief, conferring nearly every day with members of the prosecution team, had actually approved releasing this information as a kind of de facto declassification. 46 So much for ''this nation's most closely guarded and worst kept secret.'' More generally, in the wake of these allegations and court proceedings, journalists and politicians spoke of general ''principles'' and ''theories'' of bomb design that had been ''stolen,'' all by means of textual transfer. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for example, explained in its April 1951 report on Soviet Atomic Espionage that ''it is little appreciated that Fuchs'' was ''the great betrayer of the theory'' underlying uranium isotope separation at Oak Ridge. Based on ''Fuchs's grasp of the theoretical principles involved,'' they reported, ''he would be able to reconstitute our whole program [at Oak Ridge] from only scattered pieces of information''-rebuilding an entire city of industrial production from a few scraps of paper. (In contrast, the Chrysler Corporation in 1947 had tried to popularize how critical various large-scale industrial processes had been to the operation at Oak Ridge, such as certain metal-plating techniques to keep equipment from corroding in the presence of the highly noxious uranium hexafluoride gas-all techniques that built on Chrysler's in-house stock of tacit knowledge and large-scale capacity.) 47 Alan Moorehead, in his four-part series on Fuchs that ran in the Saturday Evening Post in late spring 1952, closed his report by arguing that Fuchs ''thought the worst thing he had done was to give information about the principle of the design of the plutonium bomb.'' 48 Now when physicists protested that such claims relied on a category mistake, confusing equations with the tacit knowledge and industrial infrastructure required to design and produce nuclear weapons, their tone had become defensive. No longer educating congressional leaders, they were merely offering ''heretical afterthoughts.'' 49 Two sets of HUAC hearings frame most starkly the shift in discussions about ''the atomic secret'' from raw materials and industrial capacity to text-based information. In June and July 1948-a few months before releasing their ''Scientist X'' and ''hot formula'' report-the committee heard testimony about shipments of uranium metal that had gone to the Soviet Union under wartime lend-lease arrangements. A year and a half later, deep into the second phase of ''secrets'' discussions, HUAC held new hearings, this time on the allegation that suitcases of Manhattan Project documents had been shipped to the Soviets under lend-lease. 50 The ''atomic secret'' had come a long way since 1945. The second part of the Cold War formula-a notion of atomic secrets as ''principles,'' ''theories,'' and ''hot formulas'' that could be scribbled down on scraps of paper and passed off to foreign agentsthus emerged late in 1948 and solidified during the early 1950s.
R           
Egghead Revolutionaries
The final portion of the Cold War equation-casting theorists as inherently left-leaning, indeed, as especially susceptible to Communist influence-likewise took shape during 1948-49, rather than immediately after the bombings of August 1945. Only in this later period did many come to assume that theorists as a whole were different from other groups of scientists (let alone academics or federal employees). Generalizations about theorists eventually came to be found among working scientists, journalists, politicians, and even federal judges. Some began to argue that theorists' special mental states or patterns of thought marked them as different (indeed, some claimed, as dangerous). Others pointed to theorists' unbalanced educations, their ethnic backgrounds, and even their physiognomies as signs of their untrustworthiness. Theorists became the new ''eggheads''-that term used increasingly to disparage intellectuals-and many feared they needed to be watched. 51 As discussion of ''atomic secrets'' centered more and more narrowly around theoretical formulas and information, the purported keepers of such secrets were seen in a more ominous light.
Theorists were not singled out at first. In the eighteen months after Truman enacted his immense loyalty-security program in spring 1947, for example, Congress appropriated nearly $18 million to pay the FBI to screen all federal employees and applicants for federal jobs, from the Agriculture Department through the State Department. Nearly two and a half million people were examined by the end of 1948, triggering fewer than eight thousand full field investigations, at the end of which only 200 or so ''disloyal employees'' had been found (although no evidence of espionage surfaced). By the end of 1951, the number of federal employees and applicants screened for loyalty had risen to more than four million (nearly 17,000 of whom had been subjected to full FBI investigations), yielding a grand total of 343 individuals who were denied employment as a result. The early loyalty net had been thrown wide. 52 The employees and applicants to the newly established Atomic Energy Commission-and all individuals working with the fast-growing list of AEC contractors and subcontractors-fell under the new loyalty-security surveillance. Most required formal security clearance (whether or not they worked with classified data) in addition to loyalty screening; by one estimate, the AEC investigated four hundred thousand individuals between 1947 and 1952. The average cost of these FBI investigations ran between one hundred and two hundred dollars each, and in the early days averaged two full months per screening. During 1947 and 1948, the AEC commissioners devoted fully one-third of their formal meeting time to personnel security matters; soon the number of AEC employees working full time on secrecy and security rivaled the entire population of Los Alamos. 53 From the start, all kinds of scientists, engineers, and technicians were affected. During 1947 and 1948, the The Atomic Secret in Red Hands?
Federation of American Scientists reported early cases of security-clearance problems among chemists, biologists, physiologists, electrical engineers, and both experimental and theoretical physicists; no specialist group seemed to have been singled out for special scrutiny. The following year, the New York Times reported that somewhere between twenty thousand and fifty thousand scientists, engineers, and technicians were still waiting for their security clearances, working at reduced capacity, if at all, in the meantime. 54 An important shift occurred between April 1948 and early 1949 in the AEC's official regulations, however; the change in rules unfolded just as HUAC made repeated headlines with its allegations of atomic espionage against various theorists. Now the AEC made an explicit distinction between two types of case. ''Category A'' referred to specific disloyal acts committed or strongly suspected of an individual; ''category B'' referred to the more nebulous region of thought rather than action. ''Sympathetic interest'' in various ''political ideologies''-rather than party membership or actual activities-now qualified as sufficient grounds for denying clearance and triggering dismissal. 55 Once the criterion for dismissal became curiosity and thinking in certain ways rather than proclivities for action, the balance of suspicion-at least in congressional committees and the popular press-fell more narrowly upon that group most easily cast as professional thinkers: theoretical physicists. HUAC's ''trial by newspaper'' had pressured the Atomic Energy Commission to change its rules; the new regulations reflected broader changes in assumptions about what and who constituted the ultimate security risks. 56 Sometimes scientists themselves began to assume that theorists as a whole shared more leftist political affiliations than any comparable group of scientists or academics. The University of California enacted a new ''loyalty oath'' in spring 1949, for example, and over the next two years Berkeley's physics department lost all of its theorists, either through resignation or firing for refusal to sign the anticommunist oath. Although the department also lost two of its most esteemed and successful experimentalists, department chair Raymond Birge linked specific political proclivities only to the category of theorists. With the disagreeable oath in place, lamented Birge, the department would never be able to ''induce a single first-class theoretical physicist in this country to accept a position at Berkeley''; he displayed no such concerns about finding ''first-class'' replacements for his lost experimentalists. 57 The former executive secretary of the Federation of American Scientists presented a similar taxonomy of scientific specialties and political dispositions in June 1951. Unlike chemists, biologists, or engineers, explained Richard Meier, ''the physicist by nature is politically radical'':
His mind is schooled in the proposition that progress is made by discarding various assumptions and premises and thereby making it possible to create a more powerful theory upon a simpler underpinning. The physicist, more than any scientist, deals with abstractions which make nonsense out of observations based on the commonplace; he is educated in doubt and can disregard evidence which to the ordinary observer is both convincing and conclusive. Thus many physicists chose a vague leftist political philosophy, partly as the only relatively rational set of value premises which was offered at the time ('36 to '40) in the world of ideas. 58 Though he attributed these political leanings to physicists as a whole, he did so on the basis of their theoretical methods, emphasizing ''abstractions'' and styles of thinking rather than, say, skills in manipulating apparatus or designing experiments.
More and more the associations between scientists and political leanings became a topic of general fascination and comment. Psychologist Anne Roe and science journalist Waldemar Kaempffert offered contrasting views to readers of the New York Times Magazine as to whether or not a unique ''scientific mind'' existed, and whether or not that ''mind'' had special affinities for particular political philosophies. Their debate played out between 1949 and 1954. Although Kaempffert denied that any special ''scientific mind'' existed (whereas Roe argued for it), he did argue that scientists' mode of thought encouraged them to ''turn a Marxian proposal this way and that, so view it in all its aspects, and sometimes accept it. The communistic argument appeals to younger scientists.'' Five years later, Kaempffert elaborated on this thesis, narrowing its application to ''thinkers'' in biology or physics-theorists-who sometimes became enamoured of Communist arguments. These theorists ultimately failed to realize, asserted Kaempffert, that ''it is much easier to establish the physical and chemical constitution of a star than it is to invent a social system that will bring happiness to mankind, abolish poverty and end war.'' 59 To such commentators, scientific ''thinkers'' were more inclined toward leftist political philosophies, and Communism in particular, because they mistakenly tried to tackle social and political problems the same way they tackled theoretical physics.
The assumption that theorists as a whole were the most susceptible of all scientists to Communist influence received repeated tellings, often in less benign reports than Kaempffert's and Roe's musings. Self-proclaimed experts held forth on a new and dangerous threat to the nation: ''ideological espionage.'' According to a lengthy New York Times Magazine article in May 1949, it was the number of '' 'idealists' or ideological traitors, the educated, sophisticated thinkers'' who were inclined to act against the country on principle rather than for money or fame, that increased so alarmingly in the postwar period-not the number of mercenaries or other opportunistic traitors. The latest psychoanalytic theories, the article explained, held that intellectuals committed espionage in part because they unconsciously likened the nation to their parents (who else?), against whom they sought revenge. One psychiatrist went so far as to write down a special equation for the new phenomenon:
Crime equals the criminal Tendencies (''which we all have to some degree'') plus the given Situation-but minus the mental Resistance which normal people develop over the years. 60 The Atomic Secret in Red Hands?
Be on guard, the experts now warned: mentally unbalanced intellectuals were poised to wreak havoc.
Several people began to apply the notion of ''ideological espionage,'' fashioned for critiques of intellectuals in general, to theoretical physicists in particular. Journalist Rebecca West argued that Klaus Fuchs's ''mental processes''-including what Fuchs himself called his ''controlled schizophrenia,'' compartmentalizing his thinking so he could continue his espionage even as he worked closely with American and British colleagues-pointed far beyond Fuchs himself. Fuchs stood in, West argued, for a new ideal type, ''the traitor scientist.'' This new breed triedwith disastrous results-to apply their ''rare and exalted gifts'' at mathematical and theoretical abstraction to political thinking. Although the results of their political philosophizing might read ''like the ramblings of an exceptionally silly boy of 16,'' the theorists' new relation to atomic secrets, and their peculiar thought processes, made them the most serious threat of the nuclear age. Fuchs's own attorney reasoned along virtually identical lines when arguing for leniency in sentencing, explaining that (all) theorists' overly rationalized and insufficiently ''flexible'' minds often arrived at poor political judgments. 61 Manhattan Project veteran and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists editor Eugene Rabinowitch complained in exasperation at the new tendency to generalize from the single case of Fuchs to all theorists everywhere: why hadn't journalists like West made similar leaps to the in-built mental processes and political proclivities of all lawyers in the wake of the Alger Hiss case? Yet West's purple prose soon found many imitators, including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Its April 1951 report on Soviet Atomic Espionage argued in precisely the same way that the ''warped mentalities'' of theorist-spies created ''an almost diseased yearning to remold the world after the image of their own work in physical science.'' Theorists were disproportionately driven to Communism, this official government report concluded, because they tried to force sociopolitical ideas into the hyperrationalist straightjacket of their beloved nuclear theory. 62 More than just mental states and thought processes were at issue. Part of the problem, West and the Joint Committee concluded, derived from theorists' unbalanced education: too much theoretical physics and mathematics had come at the expense of the liberal arts. 63 As late as December 1956 an influential federal judge took up the same issue. Judge Alexander Holtzoff of the United States District Court for Washington, D.C., reinstated a physics graduate student's contempt of Congress conviction for failing to name names during a HUAC investigation back in 1954. Although the physics student's conviction had been overturned on a technicality in November 1955, the Federal Court of Appeals reinstated the charge in July 1956, which is how Bernhard Deutch wound up in Judge Holtzoff 's courtroom that December. Not content simply to sentence Deutch to a ninety-day prison term (which he did), Holtzoff seized the opportunity to deliver a broader sermon about young physicists and Communism. ''The younger generation of pure scientists'' R            had become a ''fertile field for Communist propaganda,'' he declared; the New York Times carried his decision under the headline, ''Pure Scientists Called Red Prey.'' Holtzoff made it clear that he did not mean just any scientists; he ''was not referring to scientists in engineering, chemistry, and similar fields.'' Rather, he explained that ''from evidence admitted in other cases that have come before the court''-Holtzoff had presided over the cases of all five of the theorists whom HUAC had accused of being Communists and of ''infiltrating'' Berkeley's Radiation Laboratory-''the court has gleaned the inference that the younger generation of pure scientists specifically engaged in research in physics has succumbed to Communistic propaganda.'' Like Rebecca West and the Joint Committee, Holtzoff attributed the problem to recent educational changes, which deprived young physics students of ''a proper cultural background''; the new generation displayed ''an abysmal ignorance'' of such fields as history and economics. 64 Judge Holtzoff 's accusation that ''pure physicists'' lacked a ''proper cultural background'' signaled still another layer in the unfolding image of the theorist. Nine of the thirteen theorists who fell afoul of protracted anticommunist scrutiny were of Jewish background. Indeed, it had become common even among physicists to note the high proportion of Jews working in theoretical physics (rather than in other branches of the discipline); some physicists in the early 1950s still made note of job candidates' ''Jewish features.'' Overt examples of anti-Semitism riddle the secret FBI and Military Intelligence Division reports on physicists during World War II. 65 Several conservative members of Congress repeatedly emphasized during 1945-46 the foreign-and Jewish-sounding names of theoretical physicists who had worked on the Manhattan Project. 66 After the war, however, as the magnitude of the Holocaust became better known, blatant and explicit anti-Semitism became less common, at least in popular discourse. Bigotry hardly disappeared; rather, it often reemerged in the guise of virulent anticommunism. Many sociologists, historians, and social critics-people like Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Edward Shils, David Riesman, and Richard Hofstadter-observed during the early years of the Cold War that much anticommunist sentiment drew its force from sublimated antiSemitism. Older claims about Jews' supposed ''cosmopolitan'' leanings (not to mention ''internationalist conspiracies'') fit the new stereotype of the urban Communist equally well. 67 Indeed, as late as 1957 the retired intelligence chief for General Douglas MacArthur could denounce Soviet espionage undertaken by ''East European immigrants, an ethnic group that has furnished the largest percentage of agitators and Communists who can combine the benefits of American citizenship with the betrayal of their refuge and their neighbors.'' 68 Major General Charles Willoughby's listeners at the 27th Annual Convention of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies would have had little difficulty parsing just who this ''ethnic group'' of ''East European immigrants'' was. Theorists were Jews; Jews were Communists-still one more reason to treat this group as a special threat.
Beyond the basic bigotry often associated with McCarthyism, the theorists' case was tied even more broadly to longer-standing American anxieties over intellectuals. At times the charges and counter-charges of anti-intellectualism were made explicitly. 69 More often, however, anti-intellectualism surfaced in more subtle ways. Even physiognomy could invite suspicion: during this period, intellectuals were routinely cast as ''effeminate'' in appearance, their overdeveloped brains paired with emasculated bodies. 70 The trope worked to the detriment of theoretical physicists. In story after story during the early 1950s, theorists appeared as tall, thin (even lanky), with delicate features and retiring manners, whereas all other scientists, engineers, and technicians were described as short, overweight, even ''burly,'' but certainly not effeminate. Reporting Julius Rosenberg's arrest in July 1950, for example, Time magazine called the engineer ''a puffy, spectacled native New Yorker''; his wife Ethel, explained the New York Times, was a ''plump, plainfaced girl.'' Rosenberg's alleged coconspirator, the electrical engineer Morton Sobell, was ''short'' and ''chunky'' with ''unruly hair,'' reported Newsweek upon Sobell's arrest. During the Rosenberg-Sobell trial, the New York Times described Sobell as ''swarthy-faced, with a receding shock of heavy black hair,'' while the machinistturned-government witness, David Greenglass, was ''a burly young man,'' reported Life magazine. The chemist-courier Harry Gold was ''a little man, insignificant, average-looking,'' with ''broad build [and] round face''; in short, he was ''stocky,'' explained FBI director J. Edgar Hoover in Reader's Digest. The New York Times agreed, describing Gold as ''pudgy-faced.'' The chemist Alfred Dean Slack, convicted on charges of wartime espionage for ferreting out information about new chemical explosives via Gold to the Soviets, was likewise ''of medium height [and] a little too heavy,'' reported U.S. News & World Report. 71 Chemists, engineers, technicians: they might be disloyal, but they were certainly not intellectuals; they simply didn't have the body for it.
How did the theorists compare? Klaus Fuchs was ''of feeble physique,'' explained Rebecca West; Hoover agreed, describing Fuchs as ''thin, sallowcomplexioned, with stooping shoulders, balding head and weak brown eyes behind thick lenses.'' He was a ''frail scientist'' with ''delicate fingers,'' Hoover continued. Indeed, physiognomy should have revealed ignominy all along, declared journalist Alan Moorehead in the Saturday Evening Post:
Even in 1946, before anyone knew about Fuchs' real character, it was possible to notice superficial similarities between him and [Alan Nunn] May. Both were serious and shy and self-effacing. Both had the same bulging forehead, the receding hair, the horn-rimmed glasses, the set mouth and the slightly weak chin. 72 How could the British mission or Groves's security forces have missed Fuchs, since he had all the facial features of a devious, calculating spy? Nor was this body description limited to Fuchs. Other nuclear physicists at the time were described in the press as ''lanky'' and ''scholarly-looking,'' or tall and ''loose-jointed.'' 73 None seemed to have struck journalists as ''burly,'' ''stocky,'' ''plump,'' ''chunky,'' or ''swarthy-faced''; intellectuals never were. By the early 1950s, the final element in the Cold War formula was thus complete: theorists were special, different from other types of scientists, engineers, or academics. They were especially prone to Communism, the worst type of intellectual in an anti-intellectual age.
Proof in the Pudding?
In his study Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1964), Richard Hofstadter noted that intellectualism in this country has often been ''pitted against practicality, since theory is held to be opposed to practice, and the 'purely' theoretical mind is so much disesteemed.'' Trouble brews especially during those periods when ''ordinary folk''-including politicians-develop ambivalence about formal knowledge and those who possess it: ambivalence driven by a mixture of ''respect and awe with suspicion and resentment.'' 74 After World War II theoretical physicists, as supposed keepers of the ''atomic secret,'' seemed to have acquired aweinspiring power, and they became all the more suspicious for it.
Yet it didn't have to be that way. No portion of the Cold War formula-theorists built the bomb; bombs were made from formulas; and theorists were Communist dupes-was beyond doubt. Some of these elements were demonstrably false, even if the demonstrations were hampered by postwar security gag-orders. Whatever the origins of this train of assumptions (likely some admixture of the Smyth Report and Oppenheimer's escalating troubles, fired by debates over atomic energy legislation and cemented by news of the Soviets' bomb and Klaus Fuchs's confession), these allegations and representations marked an important shift in broader assumptions about science and scientists. Before the war, theoretical physicists-when garnering media attention at all-had usually been dismissed as ultimately amusing at best, and certainly not worth troubling over. The New York Times declared in 1923, for example, on the topic of ''Einsteinism'' and the new physics, that one should ''just ignore it . . . as of no concern to us''; a few years later the newspaper advised its readers to file relativity and quantum mechanics under ''things you needn't worry about just yet.'' By the mid-1930s, casual dismissals of theorists in the national media had become common: they were likened to medieval theologians debating how many angels fit on the head of a pin; theorists' equations, readers of the New York Times were told, gave no answers to life's truly important questions. 75 Yet within a few years after the war, the stuff of pencil and paper began to trump depictions of American technical ingenuity; the Thomas Edison types, hands-on tinkerers who had self-consciously projected an antitheoretical image, no longer claimed center stage. 76 Struggling to make sense of these fast-moving events, journalists and politicians poured the new Cold War wine into older anti-intellectual bottles, grasping at ready-to-hand descriptions of ''effeminate'' and devious intellectuals and quickly pressing them into action. If some of the characterizations were stale, however, their target was new. The scientists requiring closest scrutiny were not the builders but the thinkers. ''Science'' now meant formulas, not know-how.
Some might claim that in the light of what we know now, many of these Cold War precautions about theorists and atomic secrets were ultimately justified. After all, Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs admitted to supplying the Soviets with written information about the atomic bomb project, and theorist Ted Hall all but admitted his own wartime espionage more recently. Even the assistant director of the Soviet nuclear weapons project, Yuli Khariton, admitted repeatedly in the mid1990s that his group received clandestine atomic information from the American project, and that these stolen reports helped to determine the form of ''Joe I.'' 77 A few cautions are in order. First, many of the claims about the effectiveness of wartime espionage for the Soviet nuclear project were made by retired KGB agents looking to share the honor for having made the Soviet Union's first bomb. Espionage certainly occurred, but even with the purloined texts the Soviet group still had to redo most experiments, adapting stolen blueprints to the availability of different types of materials, and in general improvising at least as much as following explicit, text-based procedures. 78 The stolen information could have helped the Soviet group avoid certain blind alleys, and thus save time and resources (although in fact the Soviet leadership decided, much as General Groves had done, to march forward along several competing directions at once-even though the Soviets knew which of these processes had worked best for the American project). The major limiting factor of the Soviet effort, it is now clear, was its dire shortage of uranium-raw materials trumped textual information for several years. 79 Moreover, even with designs, reports, and data-whether received surreptitiously by the Soviets or legitimately by the British-every single country that has succeeded in making its own nuclear weapon has taken longer than the wartime Manhattan Project. Each attempted replication has had to build up both the industrial capacity and the tacit knowledge for its use from scratch. Texts simply can't deliver these. To this day, bombs have never been reified equations. 80 Obviously, security measures are essential; even the postwar atomic scientists' movement argued that certain technical details, materials, and processes needed to be tightly controlled. What I find fascinating about the early Cold War period is the image of theory-and of theorists-that drove know-how and tacit knowledge from view, especially since these had long been staples of a triumphalist American self-image. Nor was the postwar valorization of theory (with attendant demonization of theorists) a temporary phenomenon. In the mid-1970s, the Princeton undergraduate physics major who drew up his own plutonium bomb design from publicly available sources was repeatedly asked where he was keeping his bomb and what he planned to do with it-the distinction between blueprint and arsenal consistently evaded people. 81 More troubling is the recent case of Wen Ho Lee, the Chinese-American scientist at Los Alamos who was accused of nuclear espionage in the late 1990s. Lee worked with computer codes in part of the lab's X-division (an outgrowth of the wartime Theoretical Physics or T-division). The Departments of Energy and Justice, along with the FBI, alleged that Lee had committed the single gravest case of nuclear espionage since the Rosenbergs, likening the text-based codes that Lee handled to the ''crown jewels'' of bomb making-''the nation's most prized nuclear secrets,'' as a Justice Department panel wrote. 82 As Hugh Gusterson has remarked recently, government officials and the national media acted as if Lee had ''emailed the U.S. nuclear arsenal to a foreign power,'' betraying the familiar slippage from text to artifact. 83 Several lab experts had to explain that bombs are no more made from million-line computer codes than they are from secret formulas. The material that Lee downloaded had not even been marked as ''Top Secret Restricted Data''; in fact, it had never even been classified at all. Racial profiling, meanwhile, marred the case from the beginning, as counterintelligence officials consistently asserted that a Taiwanese-born American citizen was more likely than anyone else to aid Communist China. Lee spent close to one year in solitary confinement before fiftyeight of the fifty-nine felony charges against him were finally dismissed. 84 Even today, as news of Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan's illegal activities come to light, Cold War assumptions shine through. Khan has been accused of selling equipment, including specialized, high-precision centrifuge parts that can be used to enrich fissionable uranium, as well as having sent his own trained personnel to various places to set up and use the equipment. So it seems that Khan trafficked in matériel and the tacit knowledge to use it, precisely the most dangerous ingredients feeding nuclear proliferation. And yet at least some press reports have dismissed Khan as ''merely'' a metallurgist; after all, he's no theorist. 85 All these lesson-filled years later, we still live with the legacy of the early Cold War. 
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